Donald M. Cleland A History of the Santa Monica Schools 1876-1951, Santa Monica Unified School District, February 1952 (Copied for the Santa Monica Library, July 22, 1963). 140 pp., 1933, 1930s
The Earthquake of 1933
On March 10, 1933, at 5:55 p.m., an earthquake jarred southern Californians into forgetfulness of their evening meal. Close to a major disaster as it proved to be in some sections, Santa Monica learned to accept it as a blessing in disguise; first, because it acquainted her citizens with the physical conditions of the schools as nothing else could have; and second, because it enabled the Board of Education to rebuild the oldest structures and make the rest quake-resistant, with the Federal government paying variously from 20 to 80 per cent of the cost. [1. Santa Monica Evening Outlook, Oct. 10, 1933, p. 18.]
In those southern California communities where the trembler reached its greatest intensity, damage to school buildings was extreme. Auditoriums collapsed, walls were thrown out, and the very exits to safety were piled high with debris which, a few minutes before, had been parts of towers and ornamental entrances. Had the quake occurred while the schools were in session, an appalling number of children undoubtedly would have lost their lives.
In Santa Monica, however, removed as it was from the center of the quake's intensity, the damage was considerably less, although great enough to warrant the closing of the schools so that an inspection of them could be made. Four days later, while the ground still shook with tremors of diminishing intensity, a committee composed of architect D.D. Smith, engineer Phillip Rowell, and builder Robert Peterson, accompanied by the president and the secretary of the Board of Education, examined every room in each of the twelve plants in the school system. [2. Board Minutes, Mar. 13, 1933.] The inspection disclosed no structural faults and a relatively few minor damages, with the exception of the high school where fire walls had been loosened at the top of the wall. [3. Ibid., April 3, 1933.] These damages were rapidly repaired. At the same time, brick chimneys were removed and replaced with iron stacks; cast stone entrances gave way to monolithic concrete; gable ends were anchored, roof trusses braced, and many other measures taken to eliminate hazards.
Later in the same month, the firm of Marsh, Smith, and Powell, architects, were employed by the Board of Education to carry out the recommendations of the inspection committee. In their voluminous report, Peterson and Rowell suggested, among other things, that the Board inform itself as to the proximity of school buildings to definitely known earth faults, in order to determine whether to prepare for major or minor earth shocks, and recommended that all new buildings be of class A construction, properly designed. This last advice was based on the failure of brick and hollow tile to withstand the March tremblor in the cities most heavily stricken. [4. Robert A. Millikan, president of the California Institute of Technology, was chairman of the State Commission for School Inspections and coordinated the work of the local inspection committees.]
The report condemned the use of brick veneer as practiced in the past, and the joining together of materials having different degrees of flexibility; e.g. wood frame joined to a masonry wall, or a brick wall against a concrete wall. If anchor ties were used in masonry to wood, it was recommended that the ties go completely through the wall. Any ornamentation not monolithic was also condemned as was that which could not be made absolutely secure through proper anchorage. [5. Board Minutes, April 3, 1933.]
Subsequent reports from various groups who inspected the schools revealed that none of the buildings was better than class C construction, and that some of them belonged to Class D. In the event of an earthquake equal in intensity to that of the Long Beach-Compton area, they stated, Santa Monica's schools would meet the same fate that befell schools of class C and D construction there. Some of the features of the school buildings listed as hazards were: side walls too high, unsupported large window openings, large rooms with insufficient supports for the room above, workmanship in the masonry graded from poor to excellent, joist anchorage inadequate, bond beams over second story windows in some cases were two feet below roof joists, and the roof construction resting on brick walls carried above the bond beam. [6.Board Minutes, April 17, 1933.]
Peterson and Rowell, considering the problem of what to do with the present structures, stated that it would be impossible to prepare them against a major shock with entirely new construction. Confirming reports from other inspection groups, they emphasized that in a semi-major quake Santa Monica would sustain approximately the same loss as had the Compton and Long Beach schools in the March disaster. To prepare against a shock of this intensity would entail a complicated and costly program, they pointed out. A great deal could be done, however, to minimize the loss of both property and life by eliminating the hazards in Santa Monica schools known to be the same as those from which the Long Beach-Compton areas suffered. [7. Loc. cit.]
Marsh, Smith and Powell submitted their report on May 9, 1933, and the Board of Education employed Paul Jeffers and Murray Erick, consultant engineers, to review the findings and recommendations submitted up to that time. [8. Board Minutes, May 9, 1933.] While the engineers were completing their examination of these data, some fifty or more citizens made a tour of inspection of the damaged schools in the Compton and Long Beach areas with representatives of the architectural firm of Marsh, Smith and Powell pointing out the faulty construction. The group, deeply impressed by what they had seen, immediately elected a committee to make further investigations. Moe M. Fogel, chairman of the committee, appealed to various civic organizations to appoint their own representatives to serve as an advisory committee. [9. Pearl, op. cit., p. 60.]
Jeffers and Erick returned their report on May 29, 1933, describing the weaknesses of the Santa Monica school buildings in detail. The following items were included in their report:
"Many of these details of faulty construction could be corrected and the buildings thereby made safe for occupancy in case of mild quake. Such reconstruction would not, however, be sufficient to make the buildings safe for occupancy, in case of another earthquake of the degree of intensity of the Long Beach and Santa Barbara quakes. Such construction would make your buildings somewhat better than the average school building.
"We therefore recommend that, with the exception of the oldest buildings which do not warrant the costs of reinforcing, all buildings be properly reinforced to withstand some definite horizontal force, thereby minimizing the damage by earthquake, of which this type of building has proven susceptible.
"This reinforcing is not difficult of achievement nor is it particularly expensive for the average school building. Only by such reinforcing of the building can assurance be had that every reasonable precaution has been taken to safeguard the lives of the children who are compelled to occupy the buildings." [10.Board Minutes, May 29, 1933.]
Early in October of 1933, while the citizen's committee was still studying plans with the engineers, another earthquake but of relatively minor intensity, disturbed the public mind. The committee, perhaps somewhat influenced by the latest tremblor as well as what they had witnessed and the reports they had perused, advised the Board of Education to call a bond election for the purpose of providing funds for strengthening and reconstruction of school buildings, to the amount of $200,000. The bond election, held October 24, 1933, failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote, thus leaving the Board without funds to carry out the recommendations made. [11. Santa Monica Evening Outlook, Oct. 25, 1933, p. 1.]
District Attorney Burton Fitts of Los Angeles County held that the negative result of the election absolved the School Board, individually and collectively, from legal responsibility in case of damage or injury resulting from future earthquakes. Thus, on Fitts' further advice, Superintendent Davis filed with the grand jury a complete report of the steps taken to provide earthquake-proof school buildings for the children of Santa Monica. [12. Pearl, op. cit., p. 61.] But such self-protective measures could do nothing to accomplish the end results desired. And so, in November of 1933, three members of the citizens' committee-C.H. Cromer, structural engineer, Fitts, and Dr. Ellet Harding, the President of the Board of Education-met with the grand jury for further discussion of the problem at hand. This meeting precipitated an inspection of the Santa Monica schools by the State Department of Architecture, the first such inspection to be made by this department; and the information gleaned during this investigation guided the State in formulating its "earthquake code' for public schools. [13. Personal interview with Percy R. Davis, Feb. 16, 1951; Los Angeles, California.]
" . . .
The earthquake of 1933 caused considerable damage to the Washington School and compelled it to be closed. When a rigid inspection of the building was made, the school came under the ban of official condemnation and was demolished in 1934. Class work continued in tents that had been erected on the John Adams Junior High School campus nearby. [50. Pearl, op. cit., p. 28.]
". . .
". . . and in 1933 her (Miss Rice, the Principal of Garfield Elementary) efforts were rewarded. A new Garfield School containing eight classrooms, a kindergarten, and an auditorium-cafeteria room, was constructed at 1811 Sixteenth Street. True, Miss O'Leary had been aided and abetted by an "act of God," for the earthquake of 1933 had rendered the old building [at Michigan and Seventh] unsafe for occupancy, and thus it had been razed. But from the record there can be little doubt that much credit is due the principal who, for eleven years, never missed an opportunity to call needed improvements to the attention of those who had the power to make such improvements materialize.
"Americanization classes were started in the new school for entering pupils who spoke little or no English. In these special classes as much academic work was given as seemed profitable to the children; but emphasis was placed upon handwork and physical activity, and careful attention was given to the formation of desirable habits and attitudes. The general instructional program was expanded to include worthwhile activities in the practical arts. The boys worked in the woodshop on simple construction projects and did considerable furniture repair, while the girls were taught cooking and sewing in their domestic science classes. Both boys and girls participated in activities involving weaving, basketry, and gardening."
". . .
After the 1933 earthquake, the brick building [at the old Garfield site] had to be abandoned [by the Junior College] and tent-frame bungalows were built on its foundation and around the edges. Although the temporary quarters of the junior college were somewhat inadequate for the best program, "There existed a close association between the students and the faculty that might otherwise have been lost in a larger, finer building." [70. Personal interview with President Elmer C. Sandmeyer, Santa Monica City College, May 22, 1951; Santa Monica, California.]